Towards the coevolution of incentives in bittorrent
BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing system that is open to variant behavior at the peer level through modification of the client software. A number of different variants have been released and proposed. Some are successful and become widely used whereas others remain in a small minority or are...
Elmentve itt :
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| Dokumentumtípus: | Cikk |
| Megjelent: |
2015
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| Sorozat: | ACTA POLYTECHNICA HUNGARICA
12 No. 6 |
| doi: | 10.12700/APH.12.6.2015.6.11 |
| mtmt: | 2980915 |
| Online Access: | http://publicatio.bibl.u-szeged.hu/17713 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Vinkó Tamás | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Towards the coevolution of incentives in bittorrent |h [elektronikus dokumentum] / |c Vinkó Tamás |
| 260 | |c 2015 | ||
| 300 | |a 181-199 | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a ACTA POLYTECHNICA HUNGARICA |v 12 No. 6 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing system that is open to variant behavior at the peer level through modification of the client software. A number of different variants have been released and proposed. Some are successful and become widely used whereas others remain in a small minority or are not used at all. In previous work we explored the performance of a large set of client variants over a number of dimensions by applying Axelrod’s round-robin pairwise tournament approach. However, this approach does not capture the dynamics of client change over time within pairwise tournaments. In this work we extend the tournament approach to include a limited evolutionary step, within the pairwise tournaments, in which peers copy their opponents strategy (client variant) if it outperforms their own and also spontaneously change to the opponents strategy with a low mutation probability. We apply a number of different evolutionary algorithms and compare them with the previous non-evolutionary tournament results. We find that in most cases cooperative (sharing) strategies outperformed free riding strategies. These results are comparable to those previously obtained using the round-robin approach without evolution. We selected this limited form of evolution as a step towards understanding the full coevolutionary dynamics that would result from evolution between a large space of client variants in a shared population rather than just pairs of variants. We conclude with a discussion on how such future work might proceed. © 2015, Budapest Tech Polytechnical Institution. All rights reserved. | |
| 700 | 0 | 1 | |a Hales David |e aut |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://publicatio.bibl.u-szeged.hu/17713/1/Coevolution-BT-final.pdf |z Dokumentum-elérés |